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AMIS Fatalities: The Cost of Peacekeeping or Symptoms of Weakness?
The challenges to peace implementation in Darfur turned tragic on 29 September, when 10 members of the AU Mission in Sudan-Darfur (AMIS) were killed in an attack by one of the rebel militia groups. The attack on the AMIS camp in Haskanita, which was under the protection of a Nigerian company, initially left 20 missing and has brought AU fatalities to an estimated 52 killed since the inception of the mission in April 2004.
In the aftermath of the attack the debate in the media has centred on the need for the deployment of the joint UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which was established on the strength of UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2000) of 31 July 2007, to be hastened. The debate has largely served to raise expectations within the international community that the deployment of UNAMID will be a panacea for the humanitarian tragedy in Darfur. Such a perception is, however, misguided and may do more damage than good. This view is shared by the UNAMID Force Commander, Lieutenant General Martin Luther Agwai of Nigeria, who was quick to dispel any notions of a quick fix by UNAMID.
The debate should focus on the underlying factors that led to- the tragic fatalities of AMIS. The simple logic is that, to be able to protect the vulnerable civilian population of Darfur, the mission must first be able to ensure its own security. The fact that this has not been the case so far therefore raises fundamental questions about the possibility of further attacks against AMIS and UNAMID, the effectiveness of the peace operation and the prospects for success of the peace process and peace implementation.
Darfur is a complex humanitarian emergency that requires a robust mandate in order to address serious crimes, crimes against humanity and, arguably, genocide. This imperative demands not only the large numbers of peacekeepers that have become synonymous with regional and UN peacekeeping within the continent. More importantly, it also requires well-trained and well-equipped troops and formed police units, with substantive combat and mission support capabilities.
So, why is it that, in spite of the tremendous support that has been provided by the international community, AMIS’ overall capabilities have not been optimal? In addition to the perceived funding and logistical shortfalls, including the comparatively small size of AMIS (7,700-8000), the mission’s capacity for mission accomplishment has also been compromised by delays arising out of the AU’s lack of institutional expertise and capacity to provide donors with timely reports. More fundamentally, AMIS has lacked international legitimacy due to the regional nature of the mission. As a result, AMIS has not been able to stabilise the Darfur region, let alone create an environment conducive to deepening the peace process.
This is by no means an indictment of the AU and AMIS because, contrary to the notion that the AU is obliged to find African solutions to African problems, the reality is that AU missions, as originally conceived, were always intended to serve as short-term interventions aimed at create the political conditions necessary for a hand-over of the mandate to the UN. The regionalism or regionalisation of African missions has therefore not helped to meet this cardinal principle of peacekeeping.
It has taken far too long for the transition to take place, leading to the stagnation of the peace process, the entrenchment of political positions by the respective warring parties, and the intensification of the conflict (including the proliferation of rebel movements) at a time when the peace implementation is faced with the prospects of serious setbacks.
The attack on the AMIS position threatens to weaken the already fragile international legitimacy of the mission. It also threatens to weaken the political commitment of the contributing countries, such as Senegal, whose government has indicated in the strongest terms that it will consider pulling out its contingent if the AU does not take steps to ensure mission security. Even though Senegal provides only about 10 percent of the AMIS troop strength (522 personnel in a 487-strong battalion and 40 military observers), its threat is significant for the reason that it will undermine the principle of sustained political commitment from contributing countries.
The recent tragedy also draws attention to other operational predicaments of the mission. In the wake of the attack, the Force Commander stated in the media that AMIS might have fallen for the age-old ‘cry wolf’ syndrome. Because earlier threats of attack by the warring parties had not materialised, AMIS appears to have ignored credible threats of an attack against the mission. This suggests that the mission was taken by surprise and could do little or nothing to protect itself.
Even if the AMIS force had received, and acted on, intelligence indicating an imminent attack, it seems likely that the outcome would not have been significantly different. Despite having been occupied by AMiS for about four years, the position in Haskanita had only limited entrenchments without substantive overhead protection, and had no bunkers or earthworks around its positions. The peacekeepers were, at the time of the attack, resting inside tents behind wire fences that are no protection against flat trajectory small arms weapons, let alone high trajectory weapons. This operational weakness was caused by a lack of the engineering capabilities needed to put in place protection facilities beyond basic rifle trenches.
While mourning the unnecessary loss of peacekeepers, it is important to learn the right lessons to safeguard the lives of peacekeepers. The right capabilities must be provided for mandate accomplishment. Once these are in place it will then be a matter of professional leadership, in accordance with appropriate standard operating procedures, to ensure the operational and tactical safety and security of peacekeepers.
Festus Aboagye, Head of the Training for Peace Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)