The Implications of the Integrated Missions Concept for Training in United Nations and African Union Peace Operations

Cedric de Coning

The United Nations and Integrated Missions

The mixed findings of a number of recent peacekeeping, humanitarian and peacebuilding evaluation reports(1) and related research(2), and the poor sustainability of peacebuilding activities undertaken to date(3), have resulted in a renewed focus on efforts aimed at improving our ability to undertake meaningful, coherent, coordinated and sustainable peace interventions. For example, the Joint Utstein Study of peacebuilding, that analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a ‘strategic deficit’, as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding (Smith, 2003:16). The Utstein study found that more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.

 

The UN system has responded to this challenge by commissioning a series of high-level panels and working groups(4) to consider various aspects of this dilemma, by experimenting with a number of strategic and operational coordination models(5). Over the last half-decade, these efforts have culminated,, in the integrated missions concept. Integrated missions refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the United Nations (UN) family is integrated into a single country-level UN System, when it undertakes complex peacebuilding missions.

 

Complex peacebuilding missions are multifaceted systems that provide for parallel, concurrent and interlinked (short-, medium- and long-term) programmes, that work to prevent disputes from escalating or to avoid a relapse into violent conflict by addressing both the immediate consequences and the root causes of a conflict system. The peacebuilding process starts when a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement that calls upon the international community to support the peace process enters into force. It typically progresses through three stages, namely a stabilisation phase, a transitional phase, and a consolidation phase. The peace building process ends when a society has developed the capacity to manage and sustain its own peace process without external support. It requires a wide range of internal and external actors, including governments, civil society, the private sector and international agencies, to work together in a coherent and coordinated effort. These actors undertake a broad range of programmes that span the security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions. Collectively and cumulatively, these programmes address both the causes and consequences of the conflict system, and build momentum over time that facilitates its transformation. In the short term the goal of a peacebuilding system is to assist the internal actors with stabilising the peace process and preventing a relapse into conflict, but its ultimate aim is to support them in transforming the causes of the conflict and laying the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace and development (de Coning, 2007:48 & NEPAD, 2005).
The Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan released a Note on Integrated Missions that describes the concept as follows: “An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximise its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.(6)”

 

The integrated missions concept thus refers to a type of mission where there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as well as a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian, UN actors at country level(7).

 

The Note of the Secretary-General on Integrated Missions, establishes the integrated missions concept as the guiding principle for future post-conflict complex operations. It states that: “Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy.(8)”

 

It should also be noted that there are at least two ways in which the integrated missions concept is being used within the UN:

• The first way refers to system-wide coherence and the term is used in a technical sense to denote a specific type of mission structure. Through UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991, the UN has been given the role of coordinating all humanitarian assistance through the Emergency Relief Coordinator internationally, and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) system at country level. The UN plays a similar role in development coordination through the UN Development Group (UNDG) and the Resident Coordinator (RC) system at country level. In most cases these two functions are combined in the so-called RC/HC function. In the UN peace operation context, a mission becomes an ‘integrated mission’ when the RC/HC function is integrated with the peace operation through the appointment of a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, DSRSG RC/HC. The Secretary-General’s Note on Integrated Missions applies to all missions that fall in this category(9). In this sense, integrated missions thus refers to ‘integration’ across the UN System, in that it combines the peace and security responsibilities of a UN peace operation with the development and humanitarian mandates typically represented in the UN Country Teams that are present in most developing countries, even in the absence of a conflict or natural disaster.
• The second way in which the integrated missions concept is being used is more generic, in that it has become a synonym for multi-dimensional or complex operations. In this context it refers to the ‘integration’ of the various military, police and civilian dimensions of a peace operation in a single office or unit. For instance, when the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)(10) establishes an ‘Integrated Mission Training Cell’ it is meant to indicate that the military, police and civilian training functions in a particular mission have been integrated into a single unit.

 

Integration, in the context of an UN integrated mission is not intended to imply the incorporation of one entity into another, or subsuming one entity under the management control and command of another - each UN department, programme, fund, office, etc. maintains its own identity, management system, funding lines and financial responsibility. Instead, it refers to the processes, mechanisms and structures that are applied to connect these various UN entities and the peacebuilding dimensions within which they carry out their work, together into a single interlinked, mutually supportive comprehensive UN country-level System. The objectives of this kind of integration are harmonisation, alignment and coherence with a view to greater overall efficiency and effectiveness. The assumption of the integrated mission concept is thus that a coherent(11) approach, that manages to produce a comprehensive and coordinated UN system-wide effort, will have a more relevant(12), effective(13), efficient(14) and sustainable(15) impact(16) on the peace process than a disjointed, fractured and contradictory approach.

 

Within the UN System there are various semi-autonomous agencies, funds, offices and programmes that have a humanitarian and development mandate, as well as departments of the UN Secretariat that has the responsibility for peace operations. Although the core of the UN integration effort will be aimed at achieving system-wide coherence among these members of the overall UN System, the integration effort is not meant to be exclusively UN. The members of the UN System, and the UN integrated mission specifically, will facilitate, and participate in, various other coordination initiatives aimed at promoting harmonisation among the external actors, and alignment between the internal and external actors in any given country or regional conflict system. In some circles, this broader strategic coordination process of establishing linkages among all the external actors in a given country or regional conflict system is referred to as the ‘common approach’.

 

Among some donors there are also initiatives underway to improve coherence internally among the different government departments engaged in international diplomacy, peace operations, development and humanitarian assistance. In the United Kingdom this process is known as the so-called ‘joined-up’ or ‘whole-of-government’ approach. In Canada this initiative has become known as the so-called ‘3D’ process, as it combines the defence, diplomatic and development functions of government.

 

The integrated missions concept should thus be understood in a wider international context where coherence is being pursued at national level among government departments, and internationally among donors (harmonisation), between donor and recipients (alignment), within the UN development, humanitarian and environment dimensions (system-wide coherence), and between the peace, security, human rights, humanitarian and development dimensions of the UN System at country level (integrated missions).

 

An Integrated Missions has now been officially accepted in the UN System as the mission structure of choice(17). It will be the dominant management structure for UN complex peace operations in the near- to mid-term, and it is likely that the European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and others will try to apply its core features to their own future missions.

 

Integrated Missions and the African Union

 

The AU in particular has started to adopt some of the integrated missions terminology into its evolving African Standby Force concepts(18). However, it is important to distinguish between the scope for integration that exists within the UN System and that of the African Union. Whilst it is possible, under certain circumstances, to integrate the UN RC/HC function with UN peace operations to establish an UN ‘integrated mission’ in the system-wide coherence context, it is inconceivable that the UN RC/HC function can be integrated with AU, EU, NATO, or any other non-UN peace operation, simply because they are not part of the UN System. Even if this were possible from an institutional perspective, which is doubtful, it would be undesirable from a humanitarian independence perspective, in that such integration is likely to negatively affect the perceived neutrality and independence of the humanitarian community. This does not imply that the UN development and humanitarian community, and others such as the AU, EU and NATO, can not coordinate closely or even, under certain circumstances, cooperate, but it is inconceivable that they can be ‘integrated’ in the same technical system-wide meaning that this concept implies in the UN System context.

 

Instead, integration in the AU context is used in a generic sense to refer to multi-dimensional coordination and cooperation. For instance, the AU’s ‘Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF)’ refers to a mechanism where the military, police and civilian planning functions are combined in one process(19), as opposed to the UN’s ‘Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF)’ that refers to the coming together of planners from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and planners from the UN Development Group, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other UN agencies, i.e. a system-wide initiative. Integration in the AU and other non-UN contexts should thus be understood as combining certain functions, typically the military, police and civilian (which includes substantive and mission support functions) in multi-dimensional or complex operations.

 

The Training Implications of Integrated Missions

 

This rest of this paper will consider the training implications of the integrated missions concept for UN and AU Peace Operations. From a training perspective, there is a need to foster a general awareness and minimum level of understanding of the integrated missions concept among all persons working in or along-side an integrated mission. Such general awareness training needs to be supplemented with specialised training for those personnel that perform specific integrated mission related functions.

 

The core elements of the integrated missions concept that need to inform any integrated missions training curriculum are:

• Support to the implementation of a comprehensive peace process in a post-conflict setting, i.e. where there is a peace process in place and the UN or AU have been asked to support the parties with the implementation of this process;
• Recognition that a comprehensive approach requires a system-wide process, that covers the political, security, development, human rights and where appropriate, humanitarian, dimensions(20);
• Awareness of the different phases that each peacebuilding mission passes through, for e.g. the stabilisation phase, the transitional phase and the consolidation phase (de Coning, 2007:49), and knowledge of how the roles and responsibilities of the internal(21) and external(22) actors change over time as they progress through these stages(23);
• Understanding that in order for all these dimensions to be brought into play in a synchronised, appropriately sequenced and coherent fashion, the UN family, which consists of a diverse range of departments in the Secretariat, independently constituted funds, agencies and programmes(24), and the Bretton Woods institutions(25), need to operate as one integrated UN System at country level, and when regional organisations, such at the AU, are mandated with some of the peace operation related dimensions of this overall response, then special mechanisms need to be established to ensure close coordination between the UN System and such regional organisations;
• Resolve to establish a range processes, mechanisms and structures that will generate common assessments, integrated plans, operational coordination mechanisms, common monitoring(26) tools and an ability to evaluate(27) the overall effect and impact of the integrated approach that has been brought about among all the relevant elements of the UN System, and other partners, such as the AU.

 

United Nations Personnel

 

All those participating in some way in a UN integrated mission need to be aware of what an integrated mission is, why this specific type of mission design is being applied in a given situation, and which constitutive elements of the UN family have been integrated. A basic understanding of the various dimensions of peacebuilding operations, the phases of peacebuilding, and the roles and responsibilities of the various organisations that contribute to the overall effect, is required, in order for all UN personnel to understand where they fit in this integrated and comprehensive approach. Without such an understanding, individuals and the groups and organisations they are part of, are likely to work in isolation of each other and the larger UN System of which they are a part.

 

When people start working in a disconnected fashion they are likely to start working at cross-purposes with each other, which results in the system being drained of its energy as people apply pressure to each other, instead of focusing their combined and collective effort on the conflict system the peacebuilding mission is intended to influence. When individuals grasp this essential insight they become enablers that identify potential coordination problems and rectify them at their level, thus contributing to the overall coherence of the UN System.

 

Incorporating a module, or modules, on the integrated mission concept into every relevant training module, course or exercise, aimed at UN staff participating in some way in integrated missions, can contribute to such general awareness. It is important, however, that this kind of general awareness training remains focused on the intent and objectives of integrated mission, rather than its structures and mechanisms. The latter differ from mission to mission, and do not necessarily convey the meaning or intent of the integrated missions concept. It is a common mistake to explain the integrated mission concept at the level of the mission structure, as opposed to an approach (an insight that should inform attitude) that should inform the work of every individual UN staff member, regardless of the role they perform in the system. Once the individual grasps the logic of the comprehensive approach (s)he will be able to apply the integrated mission concept to his or her own work environment irrespective of the form (mission structure) a specific mission takes.
All civilian, police and military personnel that are likely to work in an UN integrated mission should thus receive training on the integrated mission concept, regardless of whether this is achieved at a generic level, specialised training, mission specific, pre-deployment or in-mission training. For instance, a civilian deployed as a human rights observer should ideally receive information on the integrated mission concept as part of their generic human rights observer training, as part of the pre-mission briefings and preparations and as part of their in-mission induction and other mission specific training courses. In this way each individual will develop an understanding of the overall UN System of which they are part, and their role therein.

 

African Union and other Non-UN Personnel

 

As discussed earlier, integrated mission in the context of the African Union refers to the integration of the civilian, police and military dimensions of an AU mission. All AU personnel, and those working alongside them, for instance UN, EU or NATO advisors and private contractors, as is the case in the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), need to understand the AU’s integrated missions concept.

 

At the same time, AU personnel, and all other non-UN external actors, that operate alongside a UN integrated mission, will also need to have some basic understanding of the UN integrated missions concept, so that they know how best to relate to it in the context of the wider country level peacebuilding system, of which they are a part of. As already mentioned, the UN integrated mission forms part of a wider peacebuilding system that incorporates all external peacebuilding actors at country level.

 

All external actors that form part of this wider peacebuilding system are interdependent in that none of them can achieve the overall peacebuilding goals and objectives on their own. Each entity or programme contributes to only a part of the overall effort, and it is their combined, cumulative overall effort that builds momentum towards peace. Each of the various programmes, and each actor responsible for implementing the these programmes, is thus mutually dependent on others to achieve a system-wide effect. And even though the external actors are not part of the UN integrated mission, they are tied into the same overall interdependent system.

 

Within this country level context, the UN integrated mission will play a leading coordination role, as it officially represents the international will through its UN Security Council mandate and reporting obligations. UN Security Council resolutions authorising UN peace operations typically include a specific mandate to perform an overarching coordinating role. There will be an expectation that most non-UN external actors will participate in the overall comprehensive approach, and there will be various processes, mechanisms and structures to facilitate the coordination, harmonisation and alignment processes necessary to achieve system-wide coherence.

 

The Humanitarian Community

 

The humanitarian community, including the humanitarian elements of the UN family, has a special mandate that sets them apart from the political, security, human rights and development dimensions of the country level peacebuilding system. Humanitarian action is premised on humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence (from political influence) and this implies that they can not participate in the UN integrated missions concept, or a wider concept of peacebuilding coherence, to the same degree as the other dimensions. The independence of the humanitarian actors (as opposed to the interdependence of the peacebuilding actors) is recognised and safeguarded in the UN integrated mission’s concept(28).

 

However, among the humanitarian community there is an expectation that most humanitarian actors at country level will participate in various coordination processes, and that some of these processes will be facilitated by the United Nations. The humanitarian coordination role of the UN is widely accepted and the UN plays this role by providing a UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) at country level, supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

 

In the UN integrated missions concept, the independence of humanitarian action is recognised, but at the same time, it is also considered necessary that the work of the humanitarian community is factored into the thinking of the larger peacebuilding system. This delicate relationship is managed by creating two DSRSGs, and giving one of them the specific responsibilities of the HC function. As touched upon briefly above, this DSRSG is commonly referred to as the DSRSG RC/HC, where the ‘RC’ refers to the Resident Coordinator or development coordination role, and the ‘HC’ to the Humanitarian Coordinator role. The DSRSG RC/HC is also the Deputy Designated Official (DDO) in the UN Security System, which ensures that UN security decisions are not exclusively premised on political and security considerations, but that they also takes into consideration the perspectives of the humanitarian and development communities.

 

This approach means that the humanitarian community has to be factored in, and reckoned with, in both the UN Integrated Mission concept and the wider country level peacebuilding system. The humanitarian community should be understood as connected with, but insulated from the wider peacebuilding system, in the same way that a specific sub-network can be part of a larger network, whilst it is at the same time protected from it by a firewall.

 

It is useful to think of the humanitarian community as those working ‘in’ conflict, and of the rest of the external peacebuilding actors as those working ‘on’ conflict. In other words, whilst the peacebuilding system intends to have an effect ‘on’ the conflict system, the humanitarian actors do not. Although they operate ‘in’ a conflict context, their intent is limited to alleviating suffering and saving lives. They achieve their neutrality and impartiality, and through it access to those in need, regardless of who is in control of a given area, by not intending to have an effect ‘on’ the conflict itself. It is thus important for the peacebuilding actors, including those in the UN Integrated Mission, to understand the unique mandate of the humanitarian actors, and for the humanitarian actors to receive training on the UN integrated mission concept and the wider peacebuilding context within which they will operate.

 

Internal Actors

 

The internal actors are the most important element in the wider peacebuilding context. They are principally responsible for implementing their own peace process, and the work of the UN, AU and other non-UN external actors are in support of their efforts. The internal actors need to understand the ‘integrated missions’ concept, and the wider peacebuilding system context, so that they can develop an understanding of how best to interact with it, and get the most out of it.

 

One of the criticisms of the integrated missions concept, and external actor coherence processes in general, is that it generates a united external actor front which leaves the internal actors with little choice but to accept the influence of the external actors. However, the inverse is also true, in that if the internal actors learn to use the integrated missions to their advantage then their transaction costs will be minimised, in that they will not have to expand resources to persuade a wide and diverse external actor community. Instead, the internal actors will only have to persuade a few key nodes within the integrated mission and external community, where after the contagion process within the closely connected integrated mission and interlinked external actor community should take over and spread the message on its own. A special effort should thus be made to inform key actors within the internal actor community of the ideas behind and objectives of the integrated mission concept, and the wider country level peacebuilding system approach.

 

For all the external categories, UN and AU integrated mission personnel, non-UN external peacebuilding actors and humanitarian actors, training can be conducted within their own professional fields, as pre-mission training, as mission-induction training and as ongoing mission specific training. For internal actors, special opportunities need to be created within the mission or country level context.

 

In all these cases, integrated or joint training, where the learning environment is enriched by having multiple agencies representing some of the different actors one would work alongside in the field, is encouraged. Most military peacekeeping training centres have incorporated some form of integrated training in their peacekeeping training centres with very positive results. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has integrated their military and civilian training units and most UN peace operations now have integrated training units at their respective mission headquarters.

 

Specialised Training

 

Whilst general awareness training fulfils an important role in generating the self- consciousness necessary for the system to understand how and why it operates as it does, specialised training is needed to prepare those who will perform specialised roles in maintaining the interface between the different peacebuilding dimensions. This includes those persons involved in undertaking assessments, planning, management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation. Each of these functions take on a special meaning within the integrated missions context, in that these are the key processes that generate a common understanding of the conflict system, a common strategic vision, common objectives, a comprehensive plan, common management and coordination processes, mechanisms and structures, common monitoring processes and joint evaluation processes.

 

Over the years the main actors in each peacebuilding dimension (political, security, development and human rights) have developed their own assessment, planning, management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation policies and processes. For instance, the UN development community has developed the Common Country Assessment and UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) process, and the World Bank has developed the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, whilst the humanitarian community has developed the Common Humanitarian Assessment Plan (CHAP) process. In Liberia, some of these processes were brought together under the Results Focussed Transitional Framework (RFTF). The UN Secretary General has subsequently approved a new integrated planning process, the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)(29). The military and other security actors also have their own highly developed and specialised assessment, planning and monitoring tools. For instance, NATO uses the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), and many military officers that have been trained in EBAO will thus approach assessments, planning and evaluation from that perspective.

 

Specialised training will thus be needed for all those persons that will be working in the assessment, planning, management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation fields in either the UN integrated missions context, or the wider country level peacebuilding context. These individuals will have to understand the UN and AU integrated missions concepts and the interdependence of all those interconnected through the country level peacebuilding system, as well as the specialised processes, like the IMPP; and specialised structures, like the DSRSGs system, and the various mechanisms that flow from it. Eventually the system will either have to develop an interface mechanism(s) that makes these various processes interoperable, or brings them together at a higher level, or it will have to develop a new common process, and persuade each participating organisation to abandon their own processes and adopt the new common process. In the mean time those intimately involved with these processes will have to learn as much as possible from each other about their respective policies and processes, and armed with this knowledge, chart out a way forward together, using a common vehicle such as the IMPP.

 

Specialised training should identify those in senior management, as well as those that staff each of these processes (assessments, planning, operational coordination, monitoring and evaluation) and provide them with the specialised knowledge necessary to understand each others processes, mechanisms and structures, so that they can jointly develop the new processes, mechanisms and structures necessary to achieve interoperability among their different systems, with a view to producing the higher plane commonalities (i.e. common assessments, common planning, integrated management and coordination, joint monitoring and collaborative evaluations).

 

However, these are also areas of specialisation where individuals and institutions have developed their own specific policies, tools and methods of operation and where one can anticipate the most resistance to change. Special attention would thus be needed to prepare these agencies and the individuals that work in them, to work together.

 

This would imply that those working in the Integrated Mission Planning Teams (IMPTs), Joint Operations Centres (JOCs), Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMACs), Joint Logistic Operations Centres (JLOCs), and those engaged in the PRPS, UNDAFs, CHAPs, etc. should be trained in each other’s policies and processes, as well as in any common tools that may be produced in the process. This can be done at the strategic level, e.g. by bringing those working in these various equivalent areas at the UN Headquarters in New York together, but should be undertaken especially at country level, where these different specialists should be brought together to teach each other about their respective policies and processes. Developing an integrated and systemic way of cooperating among these agencies is in itself a process, and such training interventions should be understood as team building and process enablers, as much as they are primarily vehicles for sharing knowledge.

 

Conclusion

 

The UN integrated missions concept has now been accepted as the guiding principle for future UN led post-conflict complex peacebuilding missions. As such it is important that all those that participate in some or other form in UN integrated missions, or those that work alongside such missions, either as part of a wider country level peacebuilding system, as part of the humanitarian community, or as internal actors, develop some basic understanding of the UN integrated missions concept, as well as the wider country level peacebuilding system of which they are part.

 

Similarly, the integrated missions concept is increasingly being adopted by the AU and other regional organisations. However, there are important differences between the UN’s system-wide coherence approach to integration, and the multi-dimensional integration approach followed by the AU and other regional organisations. It is important to take note of these differences, and to focus respective training packages accordingly.

 

Training is a critical tool for the dissemination of new policies, processes and tools, especially in highly diversified organisations or systems. Training can thus be used as a tool to introduce the integrated missions concept to existing UN and AU missions, and those working alongside them, as well as to prepare those that will deploy to such missions in future.

 

Specialised training is also needed to prepare those currently working in the specific areas of assessments, planning, management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation. These areas represent the critical areas of interface across the multiple agencies engaged in the various peacebuilding dimensions (political, security, development and human rights). As such they represent the most important nodes that need to be influenced in order to improve mission- and system-wide coherence.

 

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Uvin, P. (2002) ‘The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Vol. 1, No. 1
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End Notes

 

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