Peacekeeping Forces for Peace Support Operations in Africa
Johan Potgieter*
African leaders have pledged never to allow another genocide to happen on African soil. In July 2000, the Heads of State and Government agreed to the establishment of the African Union, with the adoptions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which amongst others adopted new principles in the field of peace and security. Foremost are measures to ensure the respect for human rights and to move away from an attitude of non-interference to non-indifference.
In July 2002 the Peace and Security Council (PSC) protocol was adopted by the Heads of State and Government, which established the Peace and Security Council. It also, amongst others, tasks the Council to promote peace, security and stability in Africa; to anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities and promote and encourage democratic practices. (PSC Protocol, Art 30, Objectives). It also states that this should be based on the principles of timely response for the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts; ‘ensure/enforce’ respect for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law; ensure interdependence between socio-economic development and security of peoples and states; the right of the Union to intervene and the rights of member states to request intervention. (Art 4 PSC Protocol).
All the above implies a competent capability/mechanism to achieve the tasks. The PSC Protocol thus authorises the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which consist of the Continental Early Warning System, Panel of the Wise, African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. The role of the Regional Economic Communities (REC)/Regional Mechanisms (RM)* in this is essential, in that they will have the very important role of managing the regional Early Warning Systems and the generation of the ASF capabilities.
The subsequent Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and MSC conceptualised the establishment of a capability for the PSC to use as and when required, and more clearly define the concepts, organisation, tasks and timeframes for the development of the ASF. Contrary to the advice of consultants, that Africa will not be able to organise and maintain more than one standby brigade, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) recommended the formation of an ASF, which will consist of five (5) regional standby forces organised as an integrated force of military, police and civilians components, designed in accordance with UN guidelines for “smooth transition to UN missions”. A subsequent challenging roadmap specified ambitious objectives to be achieved against stiff timelines. ISS researchers Dr Jakkie Cilliers and Chrysantus Ayangafac wrote that the effectiveness of the AU cannot be measured by its objectives or intentions; rather its capacity to execute its mandate is a necessary condition. The lack of guidance from the AU Commission compelled the different REC/RM), tasked with the preparation of these capabilities, to develop their forces in accordance with their interpretation of the relevant policy documents.
The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and MSC specify that every REC/RM will have to prepare, by 2010, a capability, consisting of military, police and civilians elements of about 5,000 personnel, with the ability to deploy into a complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation. That will amount to a capability of ±25,000 – 30,000. (In a recent meeting of the ACDS and Heads of Security tasked REC/RM to considerably increase the police components.). The total force that Africa is thus preparing should be about 40,000.
But is this enough? Can Africa assume responsibility for Africa’s challenges, as so many world and continental leaders are calling for?
Most of the REC/RM’s are well on their way to achieve the 2010 objectives, and have even designed for reserve/rotation capacity, but are facing challenges, which need to measure against real African requirements. There are currently about 92,557 UN peacekeepers in Africa, consisting of 66,100 military, 10,757 police and 15,700 civilians in six missions , of which Africa provides about 40%. The requested force expansion of up to 16,000 for the UN/AU hybrid mission in Somalia, which currently has 4300 personnel, will push the total peacekeeping requirement in Africa to more than 99,000. In accordance with the objectives of the ASF Africa will thus only provide less than 50% - in the first rotation with little spare for subsequent deployments. Africa troop contributing countries are nevertheless managing somehow by returning deployed contingents after only one rotation. This is not sustainable as the worldwide norm for deployment frequency is one in four (and even one in six). This implies that if Africa wants to provide only 50% of the required forces continuously, it will need a military and police force components of about 154,000 - (83% of 99,000÷2x4=154,000) trained or under training.
But is this possible? Can Africa mobilise sufficient personnel? Large parts of the about 4 million of the military & gendarmerie capability for various reasons cannot participate in peacekeeping operations, because they do not comply to specifications or some force components cannot be utilised in peacekeeping. With the political will to collaborative regional security and the willingness to reconfiguration national contingents, in accordance with peacekeeping’s force requirements, it should be possible.
The African Standby Force however faces another challenge in its realisation namely the sophistication and professionalism of its forces and the applicability of contributions.
* Captain (Navy) Johan Potgieter (Rtd), Senior Researcher Peace Missions Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
* The Regional Economic Communities of AMU+Egypt, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC were task to develop these capabilities, but political disagreements about other issues resulted in the formation of the establishment of two regional mechanisms, namely the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) (in place of AMU + Egypt) and EASBRICOM (in place of IGAD). These two bodies will have the primary responsibility for the development of the regional standby forces for the utilisation of the AU Commission.
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